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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MOON LAKE ELECTRIC, 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
PI aintif -f /Appel 1 ant, 
vs. 
ULTRASYSTEMS WESTERN 
CONSTRUCTORS, INC., and 3 
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
) [ARGUMENT PRIORITY 
CLASSIFICATION 14b3 
Case No. 870122 
Defendant/Respondent. 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to Rule 4(a) and (b) , Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING BELOW 
This is an appeal from a final order in a civil case in the 
Seventh Judicial District Court in which the Court granted 
Summary Judgment in favor of the Defendants/Respondents. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Appellant believes the following rules are applicable to 
this case: Rules 56, 59, 61, URCP. However, Appellant is not 
arguing for a new or different interpretation of these rules. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
POINT I- WAS SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPER? 
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A, WERE THERE CONTESTED ISSUES OF HATERIAL FACT? 
B. WAS MOON LAKE UNDER A DUTY TO PROVIDE AFFIDAVITS? 
C, WAS ULTRASYSTEMS ENTITLED TO JUDSfENT AS A MATTER OF 
LAW2 
POINT II, WAS MOON LAKE'S ACCEPTANCE OF ULTRASYSTEMS' BID 
CONDITIONAL? WAS THERE A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO 
MOON LAKE'S ACCEPTANCE OF ULTRASYSTEMS' BID*? 
POINT III. DID MOON LAKE INCUR DAHABEB? 
POINT IV, SHOULD THE DISTRICT COURT HAVE GRANTED MOON LAKE'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL OR TO SET ASIDE THE SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT*? 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
PI amtif f/Appel 1 ant Moon Lake, (hereafter "Moon Lake11) 
brought suit against De-f endants/Respondents Ultrasystems Western 
Constructors, Inc. (hereafter "Ultrasystems)", and Industrial 
Indemnity Company (hereafter "Industrial Indemnity"), seeking 
forfeiture of a bid bond written by Industrial Indemnity. 
Ultrasystems obtained bid specifications and was qualified by 
e*peripnca to bid a project being advertised by Moon Lake. After 
being determined to be the low bidder and being awarded the bid, 
Ultrasystems determined it could not perform in accordance with 
the bid it submitted to Moon La*e for the construction of an 
el ectrical substation . 
Discovery, mainly in the form of depositions, was conducted. 
Then Ultrasystems moved for Summary Judgment. Industrial 
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Indemnity joined in the Ultrasystems' Motion. Moon Lake opposed 
their Motion, and also moved -for Summary Judgment. After 
memorandums were submitted, Judge Richard C. Davidson granted 
Ultrasystems' and Industrial Indemnity's Motions for Summary 
Judgment. Moon Lake's Motion for Summary Judgment was denied on 
January 30, 1987. The Summary Judgment was granted against Moon 
Lake on the proposition that Moon Lake had failed to file 
opposing aff idavits. 
On February 7, 1987, Moon Lake made a Motion for New Trial 
or To Set Aside Summary Judgment. Judge Dennis L. Draney, who 
replaced Judge Richard C. Davidson as District Judge on February 
1, 1987, denied Moon Lake's Motion on March 10, 1987. 
FACTS 
1. Ultrasystems is a construction company involved in 
various construction projects throughout the United States. (See 
Ultrasystems Memorandum, No. 1, p. 340.) 
2. Moon Lake is a rural electric co-operative operating in 
Eastern Utah and Western Colorado. 
3. In August, 1985, Moon Lake proposed to construct a 
substation near Rangely, Colorado, identified as the Rooks 
California Substation. Construction was to be done in three (3) 
phases. (See Hunt Deposition, pp. 3-4.) 
4. Ultrasystems was acting as a contractor on a previous 
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phase of the Rooks California Substation that Moon Lake had 
advertised in the same manner as the phase in question. (See 
Winder Affidavit, para. 13, Record p. 452.) 
5. Whenever REA funds are involved in a Moon Lake project, 
the REA Administrator must approve all contracts, bids, etc., 
involved. (See Winder Affidavit, para. 6, Record p. 450.) 
6. There were no REA funds involved in the construction of 
the Rooks California Substation. (See Winder Affidavit, para. 6, 
Record, p. 450.) 
7. Moon Lake advertised and solicited bids for the 
construction of the substation superstructure and above ground 
facilities. (Hunt Deposition, p. 6.) 
8. In the solicitation to bid, each bidder was required to 
submit a bid bond with the bid. (See Record, p. 364.) 
9. At Ultrasystems' request, a complete set of bid 
documents was provided to Ultrasystems, including blueprints and 
materials list. (See Hunt Deposition, pp. 11, 37; Armstead 
Affidavit, Record pp. 355-358.) 
10. Ultrasystems submitted a bid for the advertised work on 
the Rooks California Substation. This bid was prepared by 
Richard Armstead and was accompanied with a bid bond. (See 
Armstead Affidavit, Record pp. 355-359.) 
11. As Ul trasystems agent, Armstead read and interpreted 
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the documents provided by Moon Lake regarding how the conductors, 
bus bars and terminals were to be connected. (See Armstead 
Affidavit, Record pp. 355-359.) 
12. Ultrasystems submitted the low bid. (See Hunt 
Deposition, pp. 18-19.) 
13. Ul trasystems was informed by Moon Lake that its bid was 
comparatively very low in certain areas, and had Ultrasystems 
verify its bid. (See Hunt Deposition, pp. 24-24.) 
14. At Moon Lake's request, Ultrasystems did verify its bid 
to Moon Lake. (See Record, p. 429.) 
15. Moon Lake accepted Ultrasystems bid on September 18, 
1985. (See Record, p. 430.) 
16. Ul trasystems subsequently reviewed the documents it had 
been initially provided by Moon Lake and determined that Armstead 
had misunderstood, or ignored, part of the information concerning 
the connection of conductors, bus bars and terminals, and 
therefore, that Ul trasystems' bid was $75,000.00 lower than it 
should have been. (See Armstead Affidavit, Record, pp. 355-358.) 
17. On September 25, 1985, at a meeting with Ultrasystems, 
Moon Lake delivered its "formal11 acceptance to Ul trasystems. On 
the same date, and after receiving Moon Lake's acceptance, 
Ultrasystems delivered a letter stating that it had made a 
mistake in its bid. (See Armstead Affidavit, Record, pp. 355-
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358; Hunt Deposition, pp. 27-28; and Record, pp, 430 and 431.) 
18. Moon Lake then awarded the bid to the next acceptable 
bidder and requested Ultrasystems to forfeit its bid bond. (Hunt 
Deposition, p.32.) 
19. Ul trasystems refused to voluntarily surrender its bid 
bond. This action was brought to enforce Moon Lake's rights 
against the bid bond. (See Complaint, record p. 1-17.) 
20. Discovery was conducted by Ultrasystems in the form of 
depositions of Moon Lake's employees. (See Record, pp. 514, 
515.) 
21. Ul trasystems moved for Summary Judgment on November 11, 
1986. Industrial Indemnity joined in that Motion. (Record, pp. 
336-338, 410-412.) 
22. Moon Lake filed a response to Ultrasystems' Motion for 
Summary Judgment on December 10, 1986. At the same time, Moon 
Lake also moved for Summary Judgment. (Record, pp. 416-431.) 
23. Ultrasystems responded to Moon Lake's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on December 17, 1986, and requested the court to 
Rule on existing Motions.1 (See Affidavit of George E. Mangan, 
1
 On this date. Moon Lake's General Counsel, George E. 
Mangan was in the Duchesne County Hospital having his left ankle 
fused, and was unable to fully supervise the filing of the 
response. Inasmuch as it appeared that the issues were primarily 
auestions of law, no affidavits were thought to be necessary. 
However, there were several references in Moon Lake's response 
and Motion for Summary Judgment to the depositions which opposed 
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Record pp. 473-477.) 
24. On or about January 13th or 14th, 1987, Moon Lake's 
ccunsel contacted the secretary to the District Judge to 
determine the status of the Motions and was assured that the 
court had not yet ruled in this matter. Judge Richard C. 
Davidson was not available since he was in Salt Lake City -for a 
meeting of the new Appellate Court Judges. A request was made to 
have the secretary ask the court not to rule until the 
pi ai n t i f -f' s Affidavits were filed.2 
25. In a Minute Entry dated January 15, 1987, District 
Judge Davidson granted Ultrasystems and Industrial Indemnity's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (Record, pp. 468-470.) 
26. On January 23, 1987, Moon Lake submitted Affidavits of 
Bruce LeGrand Hunt and Kenneth A. Winder in support of 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. (See Record, 449-467.) 
27. On January 30, 1987, Judge Davidson signed the Summary 
Judgment as prepared by Ultrasystems' counsel.3 (Record, pp. 
Ultrasystems' allegations of what was fact. (See Record, pp. 
473-477.) 
z
 George E. Mangan was still recuperating from surgery and 
was trying to catch up with the backlog that had accumulated 
during hospitalization and bed rest. (See Affidavit of George E. 
Mangan, Record 473-477.) 
3
 Said Judgment also specified that it was being entered 
because Moon Lake had not filed opposing affidavits. 
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468-470.) 
28. As of February 1, 1987, Richard C. Davidson ceased to 
function as a Seventh Judicial District Judge. Thereafter, 
Dennis L. Draney became the new District Judge. 
29. On February 7, 1987, Moon Lake filed a Motion for 
either a New Trial or to Set Aside Summary Judgment, supported by 
a Memorandum of Points and Authorities. (See Record, p. 478-
479.) 
30. On or about February 12, 1987, Industrial Indemnity 
responded to Moon Lake's Motion for New Trial or to Set Aside 
Summary Judgment. Moon Lake filed a reply on February 18, 1987. 
(See Record, pp. 482-488.) 
31. On February 18, 1987, Ultrasystems responded to Moon 
Lake's pending Motion. (See Record, p. 490.) 
32. In a Ruling dated March 10, 1987, District Judge Dennis 
L. Draney denied Moon Lake's motions. The order was subsequently 
reduced to a writing on March 27, 1987. (See Record p. 504.) 
ARBUHENT 
POINT I. MAS SUMMARY JUDBMENT PROPER? 
Summary Judgment is proper only if the pleadings, 
depositions, affidavits and admissions show that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is 
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entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Geneva Pipe Co. v. S&H 
Ins, Co., Utah, 714 P.2d 643 (1986), Snyder & MerKley. Utah, 693 
P.2d 64 (1984). The facts are to be liberally construed in favor 
of the party opposing the motion and that party is to be given 
the benefit of all inferences which might be reasonably drawn 
from the evidence. Payne v. Myers, 64 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, at 4, 
(8-13-37)s Atlas Corp. v. The Clouts Naty1 Bank, Utah, 737 P.2d 
225 (1987), The moving party mast show that, as a matter of law, 
all reasonable possibility that the non-moving party could win if 
given a trial, is precluded. Judkins v. Toone. 27 Utah 2d 17, 
492 P.2d 980 <1972), Reliable Furn. Co. v. Fidelity & Guar, Ins. 
Underuiriters, 16 Utah 2d 211, 398 P.2d 685 <1965). Where the 
parties are not in complete conflict as to the facts, but the 
understanding, intention and consequences of those facts are 
vigorously disputed, summary judgment is not appropriate. 
Sa.ndberg v. Klein. Utah, 576 P. 2d 129 <1978). 
On review, the appellate court is obliged to review the 
record in the light most favorable to the party against whom the 
motion was granted. Geneva Pipe Co. v. S&H Ins. Co., Utah, 714 
P*2d 648 (1986). The trial court must not weigh evidence or 
assess creditability and it must be obvious from the evidence 
before the court that the party opposing judgment can establish 
no right to recovery. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. 
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v. AtKin, UriQht & Miles, Chartered, Utah, 681 P.2d 1258 <1?84). 
In an action involving a contract, summary judgment is 
proper only when the contract terms are complete, clear and 
unambiguous. If the evidence of the terms of an agreement is in 
conflict, the intent of the parties as to the terms is to be 
determined by a jury. Colonial Leasino Co. M. Larsen Bros. 
Constr. Co, , Utah, 731 P.2d 483 <1?86). Summary Judgment is 
appropriate only in the most clear cut negligence cases. Ingram 
M. Salt Lake Ci ty. Utah, 51 Utah Adv. Rep 6 <Jan. 1987) Ui11 iams 
v. Mel by, Utah, 699 P.2d 723 <1986). 
A. WERE THERE CONTESTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT? 
In this case, Ultrasystems had its employee, Richard 
Armstead, prepare its bid. In his affidavit attached to 
Ultrasystems' Motion for Summary Judgment (Record pp. 355-358), 
Armstead alleges that he made a mistake in preparing 
Ultrasystems' bid. Armstead alleges that when he subsequently 
reviewed the bid information provided by Moon Lake, he found that 
he made an error in preparing the bid. (See Armstead Affidavit, 
paragraph 10, Record p. 357.) Moon Lake argued that this 
constituted an error of law or negligence on the part of 
Ultrasystems. Ultrasystems claimed that this was a mistake of 
fact made in goad faith, and that equity should relieve against 
forfeiture of its bid bond. Either scenario presents a contested 
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issue of -fact that ought to be resolved by the trier of fact. 
B. MAS MOON LAKE UNDER A DUTY TO PROVIDE AFFIDAVITS? 
Rule 56(c), URCP, provides as -follows: 
"When a motion for summary judgment is made 
and supported as provided in this Rule, an 
adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegation or denials o-f his pleading, but 
his response, by af-fidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this Rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, 
shall be entered against him." 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that allegations or denials 
in the pleadings are not a sufficient basis for opposing summary 
judgment. See Hal 1 v. Fi tzqerald, Utah, 671 P.2d 224 (1983). In 
Franklin Financial v. New Empire Deuelopment Co., Utah, 65? P.2d 
1040 at 1044 (1983) , the Court stated that "when a party opposes 
a properly supported motion for summary judgment and fails to 
file any responsive affidavits or other evidentiary materials 
allowed by Rule 56(e), the trial court may properly conclude that 
there ar& no genuine issues of fact unless the movant's affidavit 
affirmatively discloses the existence of such an issue. Without 
such a showing, the Court need only decide whether, on the basis 
of the applicable law, the moving party is entitled to judgment." 
Also see Cowen & Co. v. Atlas Stock Transfer Co., Utah, 695 P.2d 
109 (1984). 
The judgment dated January 30, 1987, entered in this matter 
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(Record pp. 468-470), states as -follows: "Def endant, 
Ultrasystems7 Memorandum in support of its Motion -for Summary 
Judgment has set -forth undisputed -facts, which facts arB 
supported by the pleadings, the depositions o-f Kenneth A. Winder 
and Bruce L. Hunt and the affidavits. The plaintiff has not 
submitted any affidavits or other documents showing any dispute 
as it relates to those facts. (Emphasis added.) The Court 
therefore finds that the facts, as listed, are undisputed." The 
Court apparently followed the reasoning in the cases cited above 
and the argument made by Ultrasystems (Record, pp. 434-440), in 
this part of its decision. 
In this case, discovery was conducted before Ultrasystems' 
Motion for Summary Judgment was made. The depositions of Kenneth 
A. Winder and Bruce L. Hunt were filed with the Court, relied 
upon by all parties and were part of the record. Numerous 
exhibits were also part of the record. There was evidence in the 
materials in the record, recognized by Rule 56(e) to support Moon 
Lake's position. The clearest indication of this evidence is 
Moon Lake's bid acceptance dated September 18, 1985 (Record p. 
409) . 
Also, Moon Lake submitted affidavits of Winder and Hunt on 
January 23, 1987, before the Court signed the judgment in this 
case. Those affidavits clearly put at issue (a) whether REA 
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approval was necessary, and therefore, whether Moon Lake's 
acceptance was conditional, and Ultrasystems' knowledge of those 
facts (Winder Affidavit, paragraphs 6 & 13, Record p. 450 + 
452.); (b) the date Moon Lake notified Ultrasystems that its bid 
had been accepted (Winder Affidavit, paragraph 15, Record p. 
452.); and (c) whether Armstead's error in preparing 
Ultrasystem's bid constituted negligence. 
If the facts as asserted by Moon Lake are true, then as a 
matter of law, the bid bond, by its term, would forfeit. (See 
bid bond, Record p. 405.) It was not the intent of the parties 
for the bond to be meaningless. Clearly, the bid bond provides 
that Ultrasystems shall enter into a contract for the completion 
of the Rooks California Substation. If not, then the bond would 
be paid to Moon Lake. 
If Moon Lake accepted Ultrasystems' bid, and the bid bond is 
not forfeited, it was clearly a pointless exercise to require 
that a bid bond be submitted with the bid. It was not the intent 
of the parties for the bond to be meaningless. The only 
plausible way for Ultrasystems to escape being liable on its bid 
bond is if the Court finds that Armstead's negligence was 
excusable. Otherwise, there would be a question of fact and 
Summary Judgment would not lie. 
C, WAS ULTRASYSTEMS ENTITLED TO JUD6MENT AS A MATTER 
OF LAW? 
Both 52 ALR2d 792 and 2 ALR4th 991, distinguish between a 
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mistake of fact and a mistake of law or judgment. Under some 
circumstances, most courts allow a bidder to rescind his bid, and 
not forfeit his bond, jjf a mistake of fact has been made by the 
bidder- 2 ALR4th 991, defines a mistake of fact as "a state of 
mind or be!ief that is not in accord with the facts" . 2 ALR4th 
at 995. Mathematical mistakes and clerical errors in ~ 
transcribing figures, omitting figures or transposing figures are 
listed as mistakes of fact. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Harlin us. Campbell, 45 U.A.R. 4 
(Oct. 28, 1986) pointed out that mistakes of law are not the 
equivalent to mistakes of facts when determining whether or not 
equitable relief should be granted. The court cited 27 Am. Jur. 
2d, Equi ty § 2? and 36 <1?66>. 
2? Am Jur. 2d, Equ i ty, § 3? states that M<a)n equity court 
will not ordinarily grant relief from the consequences of writing 
or the effect thereof on a party's rights...the misconstruction 
of a contract as written is not a mistake of fact, but one of 
law." (citations omitted.) 
Black's Legal Dictionary, 5th Edition, 1979, p. 903, defines 
mistake of law as "a mistaken opinion or interference, arising 
from an imperfect or incorrect exercise of judgment, upon (the) 
facts". (Citations omitted.) In 2 ALR4th 991, a 
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misinterpretation of the specifications upon which the bid was 
based is classified as a mistake of law. 
Although a bid, once opened and declared, is considered in 
the nature of an irrevocable option or contract right of which 
the contracting authority cannot be deprived without its consent, 
rescission may still be had for a material and inadvertent 
mistake of fact. 
In Boise Junior College District M, Mattefs Const, Co., 92 
Idaho 757, 450 P.2d 604 (1969), the Idaho Supreme Court adopted 
the substantially same test as the Utah Supreme Court did in 
State M. Union Construction Co,, 9 Utah 2d 107, 339 P.2d 421 
(1959), i.e., that equity will relieve against forfeiture of a 
bid bond if the bidder acted in (a) good faith, (b) without 
negligence, or the mistake occurred regardless of the exercise of 
ordinary care, (c> if he was reasonably prompt in giving notice 
of the error in the bid to the other party, (d> if the bidder 
will suffer substantial detriment by forfeiture, and (e) if the 
other party's status has not been greatly changed, and relief 
from forfeiture will work no substantial hardship on him. 
(Citations omitted.) However, in Boise Junior College, the Idaho 
Court went on to point out that not all mistakes entitle a bidder 
to equitable recession. Equitable recession is allowed for 
"mechanical or clerical errors", i.e., those made tabulating or 
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transcribing -figures, but denied in cases involving "errors of 
judgment", i.e., underestimating the cost of labor or materials. 
Also see Calamari, The Law of Contracts, 2d Ed. P. 308 <1??7). 
Moon Lake urges that Ultrasystems' "mistake" was clearly an error 
of judgment, namely, assuming the "specs" did not require what 
they said they required. 
The Court, in State v. Union, 33? P.2d 421, cited 52 ALR 2d 
792 in support of its position. That article states as follows: 
"The term 'negligence,' or its equivalent, in 
this connection generally means ordinary 
negligence, which will not necessarily bar 
granting equitable relief. Otherwise 
qualified, it generally means carelessness or 
lack of good faith in calculation which 
violates a positive duty in making up a bid, 
so as to amount to gross negligence, or 
willful negligence, when it takes on a 
sinister meaning and will furnish cause, if 
established, for holding a mistake of the 
offending bidder to be one not remediable in 
equity. It is thus distinguished from a 
clerical or inadvertent error in handling 
items of a bid, either through setting them 
down or transcription." p. 794, footnote 4. 
In this case, even Ultrasystems, however reluctantly, admits 
that the blueprints and materials list supplied the facts 
necessary to draw the conclusion that Moon Lake required the 
superstructure's conductors, bus bars and terminals to be 
aluminum welded. (See Ultrasystems' Memorandum, Undisputed 
Facts, No. 10, Record p. 341.) Ultrasystems also admits that Mr. 
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Armstead, who is Mnot familiar with welding" determined or 
interpreted that "it was up to the bidder as to the type of 
coupling to be used". (Ultrasystems' Memorandum, Undisputed 
Fact, No. 17, p. 5, Record p. 343.) The unescapable conclusion 
is that Ultrasystems had all the facts necessary for it to 
determine that Moon Lake required the superstructure be joined by 
aluminum welding. But, Armstead failed to make that 
determination because he lacked expertise and familiarity with 
welding, and in particular, aluminum welding. 
Ultrasystems assigned one man, Armstead, to prepare the bid. 
After the fact, Armstead and Ultrasystems claimed that Armstead 
lacked the expertise in welding, and therefore, lacked the 
knowledge to correctly determine Moon Lake's welding requirements 
from the blueprints and materials list. Ultrasystems did have 
personnel who could and did determine the welding requirements, 
and the cost thereof. Moan Lake does not dispute that Armstead 
did the best he could, based on his knowledge and expertise. 
But, if Armstead's Affidavit is correct, then Ultrasystems acted 
in bad faith and/or was negligent as a matter of law by assigning 
the preparation of the bid to a person of 1imited expertise 
without assigning other people with the necessary welding 
expertise to assist Armstead in preparation of the bid. 
Therefore, the mistake was a mistake of law and does not fall 
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within the purview o-f the cases which allow a bidder to rescind 
his bid without -forfeiting his bond. Moon Lake ought not to be 
held to answer -for Ul trasystems7 admitted negligence. 
POINT lis MAS MOON LAKE'S ACCEPTANCE OF ULTRASYSTEMS/ 
BID CONDITIONAL? MAS THERE CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO 
MOON LAKE'S ACCEPTANCE OF ULTRASYSTEMS' BID? 
Ul trasystems claimed that acceptance o-f the bid by Moon Lake 
was conditional on the approval of the REA administrator. 
Most pub!ic contracts are subject to special provisions 
respecting manner of execution and requirements as to validity. 
Most of them are required to be in writing. Consequently, 
"acceptance" as used in most of the cases does not mean the 
formation of a contract as in the law of private contracts, but 
is simply descriptive of some act indicative of approval or 
award, with the intent of subsequently executing a formal 
contract. 52 ALR2nd 792 at 793. 
Ul trasystems knew that no Rural Electric Association funds 
were being used on this project. Ultrasystems knew that the same 
acceptance form had been used by Moon Lake when Ultrasystems bid 
and was awarded an earlier phase- of this project. Ultrasystems 
knew that Moon Lake was a Rural Electric Association Cooperative 
and used Rural Electric Association approval forms in connection 
with its bidding procedures. Ultrasystems knew that Moon Lake 
did not have to obtain REA approval before awarding Ultrasystems 
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the bid on the first phase of the project. Ultrasystems also 
knew when it made the bid in question and had received -From Mr. 
Hunt the "Acceptance11 that the REA Administrator would not be 
involved in either approving or notifying Ultrasystems to 
proceed. Ultrasystems had been down that path with Moon Lake 
before and knew how the system worked. To now grasp at straws 
and claim that Ultrasystems was expecting the REA Administrator 
to approve the bid before it could be accepted, would be to belie 
the actual facts. 
Inasmuch as no REA funds were involved in this project, the 
Rural Electric Association could not disapprove any contract Moon 
Lake entered into concerning the project. (See Deposition of 
Kenneth Winder, paragraph 6, Record, p. 450.) Further, Moon Lake 
annually submits a work plan to Rural Electric Association which 
outlines al1 work that will be done on Moon Lake's system during 
the coming year. The administrator reviews and then accepts or 
rejects the same. Moon Lake's plan for 1985, which included the 
subject project, was approved by the REA Administrator. 
Ultrasystems knew that no REA approval was required or 
contemplated by law and none had been given to Ultrasystems in 
the earlier phase that Ultrasystems had been awarded. The 
bidding, etc., followed by Moon Lake and Ultrasystems in the 
first phase utilized the exact procedures that were followed in 
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this phase. 
This argument also applies to Ultrasystem's claim that the 
bond was not in effect until evidence had been provided that 
financing had been committed to cover the entire cost of the 
project. Ultrasystems knew financing had been committed and such 
a claim was without merit as a matter of law. 
POINT III. DAMAGES 
Ultrasystems argues that Moon Lake sustained no damages 
because Chevron reimbursed Moon Lake for all the additional costs 
caused by Ultrasystems' withdrawal of its bid. Using that logic, 
few businesses would ever sustain damages as most, if not all, 
losses and costs are passed on to the consumers of goods and 
services produced by the business. That Moon Lake will be 
"reimbursed" for any damages by its consumers*, does not mean 
that Moon Lake did not incur damage. Even if Moon Lake 
anticipates the full amount of damage, and recovers that amount 
from its consumers even before Moon Lake actually incurs or pays 
the cost of the damages, the fact is that the damage still 
occurs. That Moon Lake will pass on its damages to a consumer or 
consumers does not make the damages disappear. As a regulated, 
non-profit public utility, Moon Lake has no alternative but to 
"pass on" all of its costs of doing business to its consumer-
members . 
In any case, the bid bond is in the nature of a liquidated 
damages provision, and should operate as such. 
* In this case, the substation was in a remote area of the 
Rangely Oil Field. It would serve the only consumer in the area. 
That is why the entire cost of the substation was passed on to 
that one consumer. 
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POINT IV. SHOULD THE DISTRICT COURT HAVE 6RANTED MOON LAKE'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL OR TO SET ASIDE THE SUMMARY 
JUD6MENT? 
The confusion with Moon Lake's Affidavits (see Facts, No. 
244-26), justify setting aside the Summary Judgment. Moon Lake's 
regular counsel was hospitalized, and as a result, was being 
assisted by an associate who was not totally familiar with the 
procedure. Mr. Mangan's hospitalization and unavailability ought 
not preclude Moon Lake from receiving the benefit it is legally 
entitled to. 
CONCLUSION 
Moon Lake is entitled to have the Summary Judgment set 
aside, and the issues determined on their legal merits. Moon 
Lake is entitled to have its day in Court, and these issues 
resolved as a matter of law and not because of some technical 
omission arising out of a combination of unique circumstances. 
At" RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \ > day of September, 1987. 
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